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2006 Presidential Elections
 
Analysis

BOYCOTT BY OPPOSITION CANDIDATES WOULD BE UNFORGIVABLE


2006-03-23

By Valery Karbalevich

In particular, there had been voices among the democratic public calling on the opposition candidates to withdraw from the race and boycott the vote. A large gathering of Belarusian intellectuals had been in favor of that option. Alyaksandr Kazulin suggested to Alyaksandr Milinkevich shortly before the vote that they should both drop the presidential bid.

The debate of whether opposition candidates should take part in undemocratic elections has long been in place. At times, the opposition did resort to a boycott, like in 1999 and 2000. No doubt, this year's presidential campaign can hardly be called a full-fledged election.

Boycott proponents argue that since it is impossible for any alternative candidate to win in such undemocratic conditions, a maximum political damage should be inflicted on the incumbent by calling into question the legitimacy of his victory.

However, such an approach meets with arguments and objects connected with formal political procedures and political expediency. As for formalities, Milinkevich was elected as a single presidential candidate of the opposition coalition at the Congress of Pro-Democracy Forces. And formally speaking, that forum alone can change its decision and remove him from the race.

Now what does political expediency mean? What exactly is behind the thesis about de-legitimizing Lukashenka's victory? If we are talking about domestic legitimacy, that is, about the recognition of the election's results as fair by a majority of Belarusian society, it has to be pointed out that even if Milinkevich and Kazulin decided not to take part in the election, Lukashenka's name would not be alone on ballot papers but together with the name of Syarhey Haydukevich. In other words, the election would formally look competitive for ordinary voters.

Citizens who are not really interested in politics are simply not aware about undemocratic methods employed by the authorities during the election campaign. Even strong pro-democracy voters would not be quite ready to understand the opposition candidates' decision to get out of the race. It is obviously impossible to organize a full-scale boycott in the current conditions. To try to re-orient supporters (who are at least one third of voters) toward a different strategy a few days before the vote would be an adventurous and utopian thing to do on the part of the opposition. People would be simply confused.

When one says that elections are undemocratic, two sides of the process are implied. First of all, there are unequal conditions for campaigning, as pro-government candidates or parties have substantial advantages over the opposition. As a matter of fact, no CIS country has avoided such a situation. But if it is the only drawback, OSCE observers usually recognize the results of such elections, although they do criticize them.

The second and more important side of undemocratic elections is flawed vote count. Falsified vote count has nothing to do with the real will of the people. An election is called a farce in this case.

But if the names of Milinkevich and Kazulin are absent from ballot papers, there is no need to falsify anything at all. Votes can be counted in honestly and in the presence of numerous observers. They can be allowed to stand right by the tables where ballots are counted to convince them that the process is absolutely transparent. Accusations of falsifications become unfounded then. The OSCE and the West face a tough dilemma while working out their position on the Belarusian election. As a result, it turns out that boycott proponents try to de-legitimize Lukashenka's victory but at the same time they help to legitimize its internationally.

Finally, there is one more point. If the opposition candidates quit the campaign, the issue of street democracy disappears from the country's political agenda altogether. It becomes unclear then what the opposition should call their supporters for. What would they have to protest against? Whom to defend? The candidates are self-removed, and no major election violations are found. The motivation for street protests is effectively driven powerless.

In short, it would be unforgivable if the opposition candidates decided to withdraw from the race in its final days, even if they were sure that their mission was impossible.

Regardless of official election results, the campaigning itself creates a foundation for further action by proponents of change.