President Takes Greater Risks for the Sake of Greater Legitimacy

2006-03-01

By Valery Karbalevich

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, too, seemed confused and dispirited after an unexpected attack from his opponents. Always full of self-confidence, he read his short speech unconfidently, refused to answer questions (even though known in advance) from reporters and left the Palace of the Republic in a somewhat depressed mood through a back door. It turned out that after a long period of no political competition, Lukashenka was no longer able to resist direct attacks. This explains why he does not want a live television debate with his opponents.

One month before the election, television viewers were at last shown all presidential contenders and learned their names. The mentioning of the opposition candidates' names had been a taboo in previous reports. It also turned out that Kazulin obviously lacks the experience of making public political speeches. On the other hand, the tough content of his speech and a subsequent breakthrough into the National Press Center - as he managed to force his way through the guard and talk to reporters in the Center's lobby - showed the Social Democratic leader as a strongly assertive person.

Why did the authorities decide to register all the four contenders who had collected more than 100,000 signatures?

Clearly, the decision had very little to do with legal procedures and very much to do with political expediency for the powers that be. Some time before the registration some analysts said that it would be better for the authorities if they did not register opposition candidates, especially Milinkevich. The central election commission could find a slight mistake to deny registration to them - like some inaccuracies in the income statement of Milinkevich's wife, which was mentioned by Yarmoshyna during the registration ceremony. The parliamentary elections of 2004 showed that the election authorities were capable of using anything to deny registration to contenders if they were not approved by the Presidential Administration.

Those who believed that the opposition candidate would not get registration had the following logic. It is known that the authorities are afraid of a "color revolution" in Belarus. The experience of other countries shows that the critical moment comes immediately after election results are made public and the opposition brings up its supporters for street protests. The accusation that the election is rigged is the trigger for the protests.

And the Belarusian government indeed could have the temptation to neutralize a revolutionary threat a priori, that is, by denying registration to the most dangerous contender.

Imagine that the opposition is preparing for a street campaign on March 19 and 20, but the authorities frustrate its plans one month earlier, on February 17, the registration date. A capacity for protest may get much weaker during the remaining month, and then no one would be able to raise the average voter for campaigns on March 19 and 20, as it would be unclear what to demand and whom to stand up for. The ruling team has showed many times that it is capable of making moves in advance to preclude certain developments.

However, such as a scenario could be still launched during the ongoing period of campaigning and Milinkevich would be removed from the race. But such an option would damage the government's reputation considerably: first showing the opposition candidate to the people, letting him campaign and make television appearances, and then annulling his registration would be certainly unwise. Even those who are far away from politics would say that Lukashenka started to fear his opponent.

So why did the authorities turn down the script of preventive neutralization and decide to register all the candidates? The fact is that Lukashenka needs legitimacy, both inside and outside the country, in the eyes of the Belarusian people, nomenklatura, Russia and partially the West. His victory should look convincing and "elegant."

It is particularly important because he already gave a chance to his opponents to speak about his lack of confidence when he decided to held the presidential election in March instead of July. Now he is trying to change that impression and show power. To this end, he needs to win a strong competitor. He wants to defeat the opposition when voting comes rather than when registration is done. The simulation of political struggle should look believable, especially for innocent voters. He wants to show that the people of the country reject the opposition.

This strategy was recently expressed by Lukashenka himself when he answered questions during his trip to the glassworks at Yalizava. He said he would get 76 to 78 percent of votes, while the opposition five to seven percent at best. Some time later the Institute of Sociology made public the same figure: its director said that the Institute's poll showed that 76 percent would be ready to vote for the incumbent. It looks like the official results of the election are already known.

And to achieve this great goal, Lukashenka is ready to take risks. He is ready for the opposition's protests on March 19 and 20, but he believes that he has enough power to put them down. A range of necessary measures have been taken: new draconian rgulations, preventative detentions of youth activists, a crackdown on the independent media, full control over the local election commissions, anti-opposition propaganda, etc.

However, there is one danger in the script: speeches of the opposition candidates in the state media, especially television. Last time Lukashenka's opponents had such a chance was five years ago before last election. That the authorities are indeed afraid of free speech delivered in public can be seen in their reaction to the statements made by Milinkevich and Kazulin during the registration ceremony. However, certain preventive measures with respect to their state media appearances have been taken, too. The fact is that they are not live but recorded and it is always possible to cut out undesirable parts.

There are advantages for the authorities in registering both Milinkevich and Kazulin. The two opposition candidates would have to share votes of pro-democracy electorate and criticize each other - the Social Democratic leader is especially good at it - thereby dissolving the idea of a political alternative to the incumbent. And this is certainly good for Lukashenka.