Kremlin to the West: Belarus Our Zone

2006-02-16

By Alyaksandr Klaskowski

"In case of public disorder, we will react negatively, but we should anything to prevent such developments," said Ivanov on February 5 while commenting on Moscow's stance on the Belarusian election at a security conference in Munich.

One more his remark is even more revealing: "No matter how democratic you would like the [Belarusian] vote, Lukashenka will win anyway."

The Russian official has rather special logic: so, if the incumbent has a high rating, democratic "excesses" may not be observed. So, elections are not really necessary?

The nationally minded Belarusian opposition is indignant: you see imperial Moscow is ready to send tanks to suppress a Belarusian revolution!

However, analysts tend to think that what Ivanov said is nothing more than belligerent rhetoric.

First of all, it is not known whether any street action would ever take place. Secondly, the Belarusian regime has a lot of force on its own. Well-trained police units are much more useful in such cases than tanks. Thirdly, Moscow would not like to stain its reputation by a new intervention, especially in the year when it presides in the G8. Above all, such "help" would do more harm than good to Lukashenka.

Ivanov's message is first of all intended for the West. Western capitals have been begging Russia to help democracy in Belarus. But now Putin's close subordinate (and a possible successor) makes clear one thing: don't cherish any illusions, Belarus is our zone of influence, and we will not allow anyone to start any "color revolutions" there.

Incidentally, more of the same message came from Ivanov in his interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, apparently during the same visit to Germany. In particular, when asked about reasons why Belarus got natural gas from Russia so cheap, he said that Russia was the owner of the gas transportation system in Belarus. That was certainly an exaggeration, because Russia owns only the Belarusian section of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline.

Or perhaps Moscow is already sure that Beltranshaz, too, is in its hands? But does Lukashenka agree? He has said in a recent interview that he was not going to give away national property.

On the other hand, Ivanov also made clear in Munich that starting next year gas would have a higher price for Belarus, too. As for how much higher, it will probably depend on Minsk's readiness to make concessions in selling to Russia Belarusian property, like Beltranshaz and other attractive enterprises.

Analysts predict that disagreements over the property can escalate relations between Lukashenka and the Kremlin after the upcoming presidential election in Belarus. The escalation is also possible, because the Russian leadership already feels rather angry at Minsk's pertinacity in building the two countries' "union state."

"Belarusians and Russians are in principle one nation. And we are building a union state, not so fast, but we keep our goal in front of us," said Ivanov in the interview with the German newspaper.

Such statements always trigger painful reactions from the opposition's disciples of Belarusian independence, as they feel the imperial spirit in them and the intention to gradually turn integration into incorporation. Lukashenka, too, has been rather clear in recent years about his determination not to exchange absolute power in one individual country for dubious integration carrots.

Moscow-based observers are sure that Ivanov's remarks in Munich could have been made with the consent of Putin, because their content was by far exceeding his powers as a defense minister. And if his St.Petersburg's friend Ivanov really becomes a new president of Russia, one can predict serious collisions in Belarusian-Russian relations, and no matter who wins in the presidential election in Belarus, Lukashenka or a pro-democracy candidate. Ivanov makes clear Russia's new doctrine in which its geopolitical influence can be revived with the help of "gas weapon," that is, its role in energy supply.

The doctrine has been seen in action recently, in Ukraine. Although the first use was not really successful, it cannot guarantee Belarus against the same.

On the other hand, the current Belarusian leadership can hear some inspiring tones in Ivanov's words. They can be interpreted as Moscow's consent to a tough crackdown on possible street protests after the election. After a bloody uprising in Andijan, Moscow offered explicit support to Uzbek president Karimov.