EU Warns Against Unfair Presidential Referendum - But To What Avail?

Belarus Today

Moreover, Peter Schieder, president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), said on 14 September that the assembly will "draw the necessary consequences" if the 17 October referendum is not held in conformity with PACE standards. "Our concern is based on the undemocratic way in which the November 1996 referendum was held, giving sweeping powers to the president, and on the gross manipulation of subsequent parliamentary and presidential election," Schieder explained. "As a consequence, the assembly suspended the Belarusian parliament's special guest status in January 1997. Belarus' accession process to the Council of Europe has remained frozen since then."

It is hard to imagine what "consequences" administered by Brussels might actually persuade Lukashenko to change his undemocratic ways or give up his intention to rule Belarus beyond 2006 (some pessimists say for life). In the past eight years, the EU repeatedly tried to modify Lukashenko's behavior by condemning the 1996 referendum and subsequent elections in Belarus as dishonest and banning the Belarusian president and his closest aides from entering EU countries; but to no visible avail. The last time Lukashenko made an official visit to Europe was in April 1999, when he met with then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade during the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. Lukashenko is surely dismayed by the reluctance of European leaders to meet with him, but not to the extent that could induce him to correct his policies. As long as Russia continues to support his regime economically, Lukashenko does not seem to care much about his isolation in the international arena.

Given the Belarusian government's total control over the electoral process in the country and its immense experience in organizing fraudulent election campaigns, none of Belarusian independent political observers doubt that the Central Election Commission will publicize such results of the 17 October referendum that lift the constitutional two-term restriction on presidency and allow Lukashenko to run for reelection in 2006. According to the Belarusian Constitution, a referendum may amend the constitution only if it is backed by more than 50 percent of all eligible voters. Since there are some 6.5 million eligible voters in that country of 10 million, Lukashenko needs at least 3.25 million voters to say "yes" to him on 17 October.

Independent sociological surveys suggest that no fewer than 50 percent of all Belarusians do not want to cancel the two-term constitutional limit on the presidency. But the official results of polls in Belarus have rarely, if ever, confirmed findings of independent sociological surveys. For example, before the 1996 referendum, surveys suggested that some 72 percent of voters would back a postulate - proposed by the legislature - that all branches of power in the country must be financed openly and exclusively from the state budget. However, the authorities reported that just 32 percent of voters backed this proposal in the referendum only, while more than 65 percent were against it. One should not expect that the 17 October referendum will be different - and confirm some essential findings of independent pollsters.

Because of the lack of transparency in the vote-counting process in Belarus, neither international election monitors nor ordinary Belarusian voters will know for sure how many people in Belarus actually want Lukashenko to rule for more than two terms. But a flagrant falsification of the upcoming presidential referendum by the Belarusian authorities could eventually backfire on Lukashenko. If a majority of Belarusians feel themselves duped after the announcement of the referendum's official results, this could spell the beginning of the end of Lukashenko's political career. Winning a referendum on paper is not the same as winning it in people's minds.