Will New Opposition Rise from Local Councils' Fronde?

The year 2002 became the beginning of a new cycle in Belarus' political development. The cycle can be called the second term of Aliaksandr Lukashenka's presidency and the beginning of a fight for his political survival. Last year, despite an outward political dullness, was marked by at least three events that can have far-reaching consequences for the country's political development. The first one is a sharp growth in the population's disillusionment with the government, which, however, did not affect the authorities' stability. The second one was a virtual collapse of the Belarusian-Russian union which has not fully boiled over yet into the Kremlin's open game to change the regime in Minsk. The third one was Lukashenka's statement on a possibility to run for a third term, although a referendum that would allow him to do so was not officially set yet. So one has to wait for an outcome or at least the development of the intrigues that drew our attention throughout 2002. Today, Belarus faces three key questions:

- How will local elections change the political situation?

- Will a referendum on a third presidential term be called?

- Will the conflict between the Belarusian and Russian leaders continue or will it be settled?

The main question of the forthcoming March 2003 local elections will be whether a systemic opposition will finally emerge in Belarus after a seven-years break. The local elections campaign can be divided into three elements. The first one is elections for soviets (councils) of the lower level - village councils - where the vote will follow a scenario dating back to the Soviet epoch. In most cases, there will not be more than one candidate per seat. Candidates will be nominated by the authorities and the outcome of the vote will be foregone. The second element will be observed at a district level, with the competition between different candidates favored by the authorities. Finally, the third element is competition between government-nominated candidates and the opposition. The fight will mostly take place in regional centers and in the capital, the most narrow electoral field, which is, however, most attractive both for political elite and mass media.

Speaking about possible results of the elections, it should be borne in mind that they will be heavily controlled by the executive branch which by tradition has been entrusted by the conduct of the elections. It is an achievement, though, that some members of the opposition made it to election commissions. But a handful of opposition activists is too feeble a force to resist the administrative pressure, so they will not save the day. Nevertheless, those who were directly involved in election campaigns know the benefit of having at least one supporter on the commission.

To begin with, the elections are to be won. But the chances of the opposition - represented by political parties and party blocs - are rather slim here.

Events of the recent months showed that opposition parties regard the elections primarily as a fast track to achieve their narrow organizational objectives, rather than as a common opposition campaign, which if successful, could become a foundation for further political accomplishments. During the campaign, the regime opponents are likely to relapse into internal strife, evoking the old scandals that broke out during the opposition boycott of the 2000 parliamentary elections, the 2001 presidential election and the ensuing controversy over the embezzlement of Western aid.

Discord may also be provoked by the fact that party leaders will find it hard to prove both their political weight and the need for their organizations should they fail in the local elections. This will propel them to catch at a straw and focus on city constituencies which are more supportive of the opposition (especially in Minsk). This will result in the excess of candidates of democratic parties there. The outcome of the vote will be quite the opposite of what each of the party expects. In this case, it will be hard to blame the government for their failure.

It will be quite interesting to observe the rivalry of candidates supported by the authorities. There is no doubt that new local councils - at least at a higher level - will have their rebels. Two years ago, many candidates for the House of Representatives (lower chamber of parliament) that were supported by the government, campaigned on rather rebellious platforms. Waves of opposition occasionally arise in the current seemingly obedient parliament. So there surely will be some members in new local councils who will constantly criticize the government on minor issues. Some may even have bolder ambitions.

Does this mean that the Fronde of local councils will nurture a new systemic opposition? Even if this happens it will take a while. First, the difference of the Fronde from the opposition is that the former is focused on minor issues rather than the sweeping change of the situation. Second, the Fronde will represent the overcautious Belarusian nomenklatura. It will not transform into the opposition until they see the weakening of the government, which is unlikely to happen this year. Finally, in order to be a real political force, the Fronde will need political organizations and an ideology, which it can borrow only from the current non-systemic opposition. Party leaders will fiercely resist the merger of the Fronde and political parties because this will mean their political end.

It will take time before the critical mass for political changes will accumulate in the country. The local election will hardly be a watershed in this respect.