Referendum and Early Election: Lukashenka's Formula of Survival

2003-01-21

In his last year's statements, Belarusian leader, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, made it clear that he was going to run for a third presidential term, which will require holding a referendum to amend the Constitution. A referendum has not been officially set yet. That is why each new public statement of the Belarusian leader is anticipated with anxiety.

It is highly probable that the referendum will be held this year because first, Lukashenka will never accept that he will have to leave office and second, as time passes by, it will be increasingly difficult for him to stage a referendum without considerable political losses. So the second half of 2003 is an ideal timing for the referendum.

The maximum objective of the Belarusian ruler is not only to hold a referendum with the desired results, but also to ensure confidence in the results both in the country and abroad. It is imperative to make sure that the introduction of amendments to the Constitution should not boil over into the Pyrrhic victory, i.e. that the majority of domestic and foreign factors should not turn against the incumbent at the time of the next election. Is Lukashenka's defeat in the election possible? It is, but it will only happen when the foundations of his power start reeling. These foundations are first, voters' support; second, the opposition's weakness; third, the administrative levers; and fourth, a favorable influence of foreign factors, primarily Russia.

The year 2002, despite its seeming hopelessness, proved that Lukashenka may face problems with two of the four factors - voters and Russia - quite soon. While the opposition is split and the government keeps an all-out control over officials, the Belarusian leader has nothing to fear. But a crisis in at least one of the two other factors can create a situation that will make a change in the political regime quite possible. This will not happen today or tomorrow but who will say for sure what will happen in three years or so?

Lukashenka will certainly risk if he decides to hold a referendum in a year and postpone the presidential election for several years. Therefore he may choose one of the two possible courses of actions.

The first one is to call an early presidential election, in which he is bound to win, right after the referendum. It is quite probable because a wave of rebellion will hardly emerge among the nomenklatura in such a short term. In addition, the opposition will hardly come out strong after an expected failure in the March 2003 local elections.

Furthermore, key foreign players will not be focused on Lukashenka. The major reason is the forthcoming election campaign in Russia. Its winner is known for certain. But in the current political cycle, Russian President Vladimir Putin does not need just a victory. His main concern will be to create conditions to extend his own rule, which is currently restricted to two four-year terms. In Russia, this can be achieved in a more civilized manner, for example, by abolishing the presidential republic in favor of a parliamentary or a parliamentary-presidential one. As the leader of the biggest party Putin could be appointed prime minister with nearly the same powers that he enjoys now. So it is not the presidential election, in which he will have no serious rivals, that will play the main role, but the parliamentary elections, in which the Putin administration will have to wage a serious fight with the Communists to ensure the majority.

Lukashenka is certainly aware of that. He also quite adequately measures the degree of his influence on public opinion in Russia. It is not large, but those few percentage points of the votes that may be lost to the Communists in case of a serious conflict between Putin and Lukashenka will become an inexcusable loss for the Russian government in the December parliamentary elections. That is why one of the two stages of the referendum-early election combination in Belarus may be set for this December.

The West is likely to be taken unawares by such a scenario, which coupled with a lack of effective levers of influence on the Belarusian situation and preoccupation with its own problems (a war in Iraq and the enlargement of NATO and the EU) will reduce its role to nothing. Moreover, Lukashenka may "toss a bone" to the European community by ostentatiously expanding parliament's powers without changing them in reality. Actually, the redistribution of functions between the branches of power can be used an a motive for an early election.

The second option is the extension of presidential powers through a referendum in a more coarse manner. In other words, it is an attempt to kill two birds with one stone, taking into account all the above mentioned factors that will allow Lukashenka to realize this decision.

But it seems that the option of the election will be more acceptable for the Belarusian leader. The reason is simple. It is much more easier for Lukashenka today to ensure a plausible victory in the presidential election (in which he will compete with the opposition) than in a referendum (in which he will oppose himself).

All in all, Lukashenka has three real alternatives. The first one is not to undertake anything and wait till his term expires in September 2006, which is equal to suicide for him. The second one is to hold a referendum and wait for the 2006 election, risking to face a Yugoslav scenario (no matter how improbable it seems now). Finally, the third option is to extend his powers through a referendum (it is also possible, but to a lesser extent).

On the contrary, by holding a referendum and an early election, Lukashenka can extend his term without risk. That is why domestic political actors should take this possibility seriously.

As for the development of relations with Russia in 2003, they should be looked upon through the prism of Lukashenka's intention to extend his term. If Lukashenka is serious about staying in power after 2006 he should ensure Russia's interests in Belarus. This first of all concerns the privatization of Belarus' state-owned gas transportation and supply enterprise Beltranshaz and petrochemical enterprises. Moreover, the current year is probably the last one when Lukashenka will be able to use Belarusian property as a bargaining chip in political relations with Moscow. Putin will counter any attempts of the Belarusian leader to retain power unless he launches privatization. So he will have to sell several big Belarusian enterprises to Russian companies to ensure Russia's non-interference in all events concerning the referendum.

We are at the beginning of a very interesting political year, which will show how the government will develop the strategy of its survival and how effectively it will implement it.