Opposition Stands no Chances of Entering Government System in Local Elections

2002-12-10

Clearly the local councils will not become the authorities' support. The main government's support for the time being are officials, law-enforcement agencies and the First National Television Channel coupled with the state-dominated press. All other institutions are viewed as potential hotbeds of resistance that are to be rooted out. The government would rather have a moribund but loyal civil structure than let dissenters in. The government's answer to the youth street protests in 1996 was the formation of the pro-presidential Belarusian Patriotic Youth Union. The Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus got a new boss, Leanid Kozik, former deputy head of the Presidential Administration, after trade union leader Uladzimir Hancharyk challenged Lukashenka in the 2001 presidential election. Today, when the opposition got over the election boycott syndrome, Lukashenka proclaimed the local councils the support of the ruling regime.

After the devastating defeat in the presidential election - hardly anybody would deny that Lukashenka would have won even without ballot-rigging - the opposition spent a good half of the year talking that it should revise its course, that the boycott tactics and marginalization proved wrong and that it should reach out to people and chase their votes; only to relapse into the same old mistakes. Nearly six months ago, the opposition began eating the calf in the cow's belly, when they started dividing constituencies. But the memories of a scandal involving some opposition leaders who allegedly embezzled foreign aid during the presidential campaign were still fresh. Furthermore, opposition leaders continued their turf wars, so the coordination of positions in the run-up to the local elections produced little effect. As a result, the concepts 'elections' and 'opposition' are no longer associated with each other.

It is a unique situation. On the one hand, the government seems to be losing ground. The economy is collapsing. Polls show that the feelings of discontent with the government are growing among the population. Foreign factors, both the Western and - for the first time ever - the Russian one are working against Lukashenka. On the other hand, there is overall inertia. Never before has Belarus' political field been so empty. Never before there has been no one to challenge the authorities. Street protests are history now. Today, the opposition longer dreams of leading 100,000 followers in the streets and is quite content to have 2,000. There is not a trace of organized opposition to the government. The reason is that Belarusian opposition forces do not have a political strategy. Their major goal is to change the regime. But the opposition has not articulated how it is going to do it. There is much talk about things that should be done on the first, fifth or tenth day after coming to power. But nothing is said about the way leading to that first day. If the opposition places a wager on the elections, what is the goal of its campaign? Is it to make a stir or to try and win seats? If it wants to be elected to local councils, then again, with what end in view? Is it going to deal with local issues or use them as a springboard for parliamentary and later, presidential elections? What kind of contacts, if any, is it going to maintain with elite groups, the press and non-governmental organizations? Without answers to these questions, any political campaign is senseless.

I am convinced that the opposition will argue again that local councils have no rights and powers and there is no use, therefore, to run for the seats. This is not entirely true, because local councils have the right to approve (or reject) local executives, approve (or reject) local budgets, as well as a chance to exert some influence in local mass media. If only the opposition could make a good use of those small powers and channel them in the right directions at least in some parts of Belarus.

Finally, there is a perennial argument of political underdogs who claim that the administrative levers are too strong to cope with. Polls show, however, that nearly a third of the population are ready to vote for opponents of the current government. With such backing, the opposition can garner a critical mass of popular support at least in cities and tip the scales in its favor. But to do so, it should have completed preparations - with the distribution of constituencies and candidate nomination - six months before the elections. The next step should have been to target constituencies, stir up the public opinion with social campaigns, raise awareness about local problems and establish contacts with local elite networks.

There is an abundance of problems to raise during the campaigning. Three of them are sure to strike a chord with voters. First, the government-condoned extortion of donations for the construction of a new building of the National Library, which touched off popular discontent. Second, the destruction of the social sphere by the government. Third, attacks on private business which affected the entire population. Alas, nobody has raised these problems. Lukashenka, meanwhile, tasked the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for State Security with ensuring public order during the election process. Here again it left the opposition behind.

Some opposition leaders view local elections as too petty. They are yet to learn that all politics is local. If the opposition made a decision to return to mainstream politics it should have grasped that local elections are the first step leading to big political victories. Success in local elections is a way to succeed in parliamentary elections. When these are won, one can contemplate running in the presidential election. A seat in a local council does not provide much powers, but it is better than to have nothing at all. March 2 will mark the beginning of a political cycle that will be completed in 2006, and a false start will greatly undermine chances for success.

The opposition has not understood yet that in the current circumstances, it will only be able to win election when it ensures popular support before the election campaign begins. The forces are too unequal to hope to win a propaganda blitzkrieg during a month. That is why the regime opponents should start each next campaign as soon as the previous one is over. But the Belarusian opposition has been bogged down in scandals since September 2001. It is dismaying when the opposition praises it as a great achievement that the September meeting of the Coordinating Council of Opposition Political Parties was for the first time not sponsored by the OSCE.

It is obvious that opposition activity has long become political business. But the failure in the 2001 elections has drastically changed the attitude of foreign sponsors to the Belarusian opposition. As a result, the cash-strapped opposition has become sluggish in its activities.

Much will depend on the so-called protest voters. Part of them are likely to stay home, and part of their votes will be stolen in favor of candidates loyal to the government. The rest will cast their votes for "opposition-like candidates," for example, businesspeople who are traditionally thought to be progressive-minded. The local elections are also likely to produce maverick adventurists who will try to play a big political game. But the experience of few rebels in the lower chamber of parliament suggests that such people, as a rule, lack the skills of public politicians, organizational resources, and, most importantly, a political will and a perspective that would help them adjust their actions. It is probable, therefore, that the formation of organized opposition will be postponed till the 2004 elections for the House of Representatives. But this will be a much more heavier task in a two years' time.